Memorandum to Bill Clinton on Bosnia Policy 1994

Text from above file – not sure there is much here but we will keep adding to it. Post your findings or ideas below for discussion.

Principals of the arms met Tuesday afternoon to review planning for lifting embargo and our political strategy from now until mid-October, Security Council after which you have pledged to introduce a UN resolution to lift the embargo. Principals strategy aimed agreed at maximizing we should press forward with our current accept the Contact pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to Group proposal. In addition to encouraging Milosevic’s steps to isolate the Bosnian Serbs with limited sanctions relief, we will make an all-out effort to implement the disincentives agreed earlier by the Contact Group, in particular to carry out air strikes in response to violations of the exclusion reluctant zones. allies This will require pressuring Boutros-Ghali and of the UNPROFOR commanders (especially the UK) to override the objections to any use of air power. ncipals continue to see major risks in lifting the embargo, even if done multilaterally. They recognized that there may be. factors arguing for delay when the October 15 deadline (now established in the DoD Authorization Bill) rolls around: Allies and Contact the Russians Group may argue that more time is needed for other resolution measures to play out, and thus oppose a lift themselves may in the prefer Security to wait Council in November; and the Bosnians till spring if there is no way to persuade UNPROFOR to remain after lift. Indeed, the JCS military planners have concluded that the rearmament program and air campaign that must accompany lift could be more effectively pursued if we delayed for 4-6 months. Nevertheless, commitment Principals agreed that we had to uphold our October to the Congress to act on multilateral lift after leverage 15, and that the prospect of lift provides important vis-a-vis the Serbs and our Contact Group partners. If the Contact Group strategy shows promise in mid-October, we may be able to gain some flexibility on timing of lift from the Congress. implementing (We will not, however, have much flexibility in of enforcement the Nunn amendment provision that DoD cease funding a far more limited of the arms embargo after November 15; but that is action than unilateral lift in that we would at most be restricted from participating in aspects of NATO’s sanctions enforcement in the Adriatic.)